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More on the Effects of Divisive Primaries 0
JOHNC. COMER

University of Nebraska-Lincoln
There seems to be a widespread belief among political commentators
and political analysts that primary elections, particularly those that
divide the party at either the organizational or electoral level, undermine
the capacity of the party to wage an effective general election campaign.
They reason that party activists, as well as rank and file voters, who
prefer a candidate that loses a hard fought primary will be less willing
to work, campaign, and vote for the party's candidate in the general
election. Indeed, hard fought contests may ev.en drive the loser's supporters to the opposition. It seems plausible that those who support a
loser in the primary might be somewhat less motivated in the November
campaign than if their candidate had won. Conversely, those who support a winner may be more enthusiastic. While there is a great deal of
supposition and impre_ssion regarding the negative effects of divisive
primaries on party and candidate electoral fortunes, there is still relatively
little in the way of systematic evidence to support the argument. Using
the county as a unit of analysis, this paper examines the impact of
primary divisiveness at the electoral level on a measure of general election performance in the 1970 elections for governor and U. S. Senate
in Ohio. It also examines the impact on election performance of support
for winning and losing primary candidates among county party chairmen. Thus, the analysis combines an examination of two components of
party divisiveness in primary elections, the electoral and organizational.

Relevant Literature
The divisive effects of primary elections on party organization is a
recurrent theme in the literature on political parties. V. 0. Key writes,
for example, that the adoption of the direct primary opened the way for
disruptive forces that gradually fractionalized the party organization.
The primary, Key suggests, permitted direct appeals by politicians to
party members and rank and file which generated factions and cliques
attached to individual candidates. 1 Frank Sorauf echoes these feelings.
0
The author wishes to thank Susan Welch, Department of Political Science,
University of Nebraska, for her helpful comments on the manuscript.
'1 V. 0. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed., New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 342.
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He notes that primaries pit party worker against party worker, party
group against party group, resulting in deep wounds slow to heal. He
suggests that the cost to the health and strength of the party is considerable. 2 Add to these comments the impressions of political commentators, and the evidence for the debilitating effects of primary elections on political parties is compelling. 3
However, Andrew Hacker concludes that a divisive primary is little
more likely than a non divisive primary to influence a candidate's election chances. Using aggregate election data, Hacker analyzed 220 elections for governor and U. S. senator for the period 1956 to 1964. Defining a divisive primary as one where the winner received less than
65 percent of the vote, he finds other factors more significant than the
nature of the primary to general election success. Incumbency, the competitive position of the parties, the office contested, and turnout are
associated with winning. With these factors controlled, he concludes
there is no difference in success between those with divisive primaries
and those without. 4 Bernstein, however, has replicated a portion of
Hacker's analysis and observes the opposite. Noting that Hacker misinterpreted his findings, Bernstein concludes divisive primaries do indeed lessen a candidate's chances in the general election, and this is
true with both the effects of incumbency and party competition controlled. Examining 293 elections for the U. S. Senate between 1956 and
1972, he finds incumbents less likely to win re-election when they won
nomination by less than 20 percent of the vote. In competitive situations,
he observes that the harmful effects of a divisive primary are even more
pronounced, incumbents rarely winning when their primary victory is
close and rarely losing when it is the opposition primary that is close.G
In a somewhat more narrowly based study, Clem and Meier note
only a slight correlation between a divisive primary and general election
success. Examining elections for governor , U. S. senator, and U. S.
representative from 1946 to 1974 in South Dakota , they observe that
contested primaries on occasion lead to greater general election margins
than expected. They comment that contested primaries may add to a
candidate's visibility, particularly for the out-party, and as a result,
2 Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America ( 4th ed., Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1980), p. 213.
8 The Making of the President, 1960, quoted in Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics
in America (4th ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p . 213.
4 Andrew Hacker, "Does a Divisive Primary Harm a Candidate's
Election
Chances?" Ameri can Political Science Review , 59 ( 1965 ), 105-110.
11Robert A. Bernstein, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt : U. S. Senate Races, 19561972," American Political Science Review, 71 (Jun e, 1977), 540-545.
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greater election success. In short, they conclude divisive primaries need
not hurt a candidate's election chances , nor need non divisive primaries
belp.s Studies such as these are , however, somewhat limited in that they
only treat aggregate election data. Frank Sorauf has pointed out, for
example, that they do not rule out the possibility of a general harm to
and weakening of the party organization. 7
Johnson and Gibson address themselves in a way to Sorauf's point
in a study of campaign workers in a congressional election in Iowa. The
authors examined primary and general election activity among Republican and Democratic activists who supported and worked for opposing primary candidates. Their concern was the impact of winning
and losing on motivation. Do those who support a primary loser move
from the defeated candidate to the victor, or do they withdraw from
political activity? Or what effects, if any, are produced by a divisive
primary? Are the effects permanent or are they temporary?
The authors conclude that a divisive primary depletes the number
of persons available to work for the organization in the general election
and that the party organization is splintered. One-half of the campaign
workers reported being more active in the primary than the general
election. Three-fourths of those who supported a loser were less active,
while only one-fourth of those who supported a winner reported less
activity. Better than 12 percent of the campaign workers indicated that
they were going to vote for the opposition party in November. Another
5 to 7 percent were undecided or responded that they would vote for
neither candidate. Of those who supported primary losers, 44 percent
said they would vote for the candidate who had defeated their primary
preference, but they would not work for him. Six percent said they
would vote for neither candidate, and 20 percent indicated that they
would work for the other party. In general, the evidence suggests that
a divisive primary limits the effectiveness of the party by reducing the
number of campaign workers and voter support in the general election.
The effects appear, however, to be temporary. There were no differences
between winners and losers in response to future political activity and to
serving a more responsible position in the party. 8
6 Alan L. Clem and Kenneth J. Meier, "Another Look at the Effects of Divisive
Party Primaries: The South Dakota Experience, 1964-1974," Public Affairs (Vermillion, South Dakota: Governmental Research Bureau, University of South Dakota ,
1975) , pp. 1-4.
7 Sorauf, Party Politics, n. 7, p. 218.
8 Donald B. Johnson and James R. Gibson, "The Divisive Primary Revisited:
Party Activists in Iowa," American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974), 67-77.
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The findings of Johnson and Gibson may reflect in part the nature of
the organizations they examine. They asked the candidates to supply
the names of persons active in their campaigns. Their analysis treats, as
a result, the effects of a divisive primary on candidate organization.•
There may be little reason to expect a divisive primary to have similar
effects on the regular party organization. Candidate organizations are
committed to the candidates ; regulars may be committed to the party
itseH. Activities and concerns of the regular organization may transcend
individual candidacies. Candidates come and go, but the organization
remains. Regulars may avoid any activity that jeopardizes or compromises the organization. Moreover , it seems that expectations associated with official positions in th e party would demand a concerted
effort on behalf of the party's candidates regardless of personal inclinations. Consistent with this , Comer observes little difference between
levels of general election support among party leaders who supported
winners and losers in a highly divisive primary election. 10 It may be
that regular organizational activists are uninfluenced by or rise above
divisive primaries.
None of the above studies deal with the impact of divisive primaries
on general election success in terms of the number of votes a candidate
receives. Highly contested primaries may make a difference in terms of
a candidate's share of the general election vote but only rarly alter the
outcome. Pierson and Smith address themselves to this possibility by
examining all major party gubernatorial primaries from 1903 to 1968
in all but eleven southern states. Treating divisiveness as an interval
measure ( the winners percentage of the total vote for the two highest
vote getters), the authors conclude that the relationship between primary
divisiveness and general election vote is almost non existent. In both
the Republican and Democratic party , divisiveness accounted for less
than one percent of the variance in general election vote and the direction of relationships were opposite of expectations. That is, divisiveness
added to a candidate 's share of the general election vote. These patterns
remained with both incumbency and party competition controlled.11
The research here continues this line of inquiry by examining the
relationship between the percentage of the primary election vote at the
county level for the winner of the primary state-wide, hereafter referred to as primary divisiveness , and the percentage of the party's vote
9 This is reve aled in the fact that 61 percent of the Johnson and Gibson group
did not hold a party office at the time, and 48 per cent had never held a party office.
10 John Comer, "Another Look at the Effects of the Divisive Primary," American
Politics Quarterly , 4 (January, 1976), 121-218.
11 James E. Pierson and T . Smith, "Primary Divisiveness and General Election
Success: A Re-examination," Journal af Politics, 37 (May, 1975), 555-562.
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in the general election. Like Pierson and Smith, it treats primary divisiveness as an interval measure and relates divisiveness to candidate shares
of the general election vote. However, it also examines the manner . in
which the preferences and activities of party leaders influence the general election vote. Thus , it focuses on a dimension of the thesis heretofore ignored , the comparative influence of organizational and electoral
divisions in the primary election. Key and Sorauf were concerned pri marily with the organizational consequences of divisive primaries. Hacker
and others treat divisions among the rank and file.

The Primary Elections in 1970
The primary elections in Ohio in 1970 for governor and U. S. Senate
provide an appropriate context for testing the divisive primary thesis.
At the rank and file level, both parties were seriously divided over their
nomination for governor and U. S. Senate. There were no incumbents
running for re-election and all the candidates were well-known. The
Republican gubernatorial primary found Roger Cloud contesting Donald
Lukens and Paul Brown for the nomination. Cloud served several terms
as state auditor and was for several years a dominant and powerful
leader in the state legislature. Lukens, a congressman from southwestern
Ohio, was a young and articulate spokesman for conservatism among
Ohio Republicans. Brown was attorney general of the state. Cloud won
nomination with 51 percent of the vote. In the Democratic Party, John
Gilligan contested somewhat lesser known Democrats, Mark EcElroy
and Robert Seeney. Gilligan had served a term in Congress and had
been the party's nominee for U. S. Senate in 1968. Gilligan, a liberal,
was not too popular with some conservative Democrats in the . state,
but it was widely recognized that he had the be.st chance of winning
the governorship. Sweeney had served several terms in Congress . Gilligan won the primary with 60 percent of the vote.
The Senate primary in the Republican Party found James Rhodes ,
a two term incumbent governor, contesting an incumbent congressman,
Robert Taft , Jr. Before serving two terms as governor, Rhodes se~ed
as stat e auditor , and before that, as mayor of Columbus. Taft was serving his third term in Congress, and had run for the Senate once before.
Taft beat Rhodes with slightly less than 51 percent of the vote. The
Democratic Party found nationally known John Glenn , contesting a
highly expert long-time Democratic Party politician, Howard Metzenbaum . Glenn achieved fame as an astronaut. Metzenbaum served as
campaign manager for retiring Senator Steven Young in Young's previous
Senate campaigns. Metzenbaum was also active in Democratic Party
politics in C.uyahoga (Cleveland) County. Metzenbaum won the primary
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with 46 percent of the vote. Less than 2 percent of the total vote
separated the two candidates in what was a four man race. 12 In the
general election, Taft defeated Metzenbaum by 70,000 votes and Gilligan
defeated Cloud by 350,000.
The party was likewise divided at the organizational level. As an
indication, consider that 12 percent of the county chairmen in the
Democratic Party preferred a loser in the party's gubernatorial primary
and 62 percent preferred the loser in the Senate primary. Twenty-six
percent of the Republican chairmen preferred a loser in their party's
gubernatorial primary and 80 percent preferred the loser in the Senate
primary. 13 While party chairmen are only one element of the local
organization, they are an important element. They have considerable
influence within the local organization and are often responsible for the
party's campaign for state-wide offices within the counties. Any impact
on the vote owing to the activity or inactivity of the party organization
is likely to be revealed in the preferences and activities of the local
county chairman.
Methodology
Primary divisiveness at the electoral level reflects the division of the
vote among primary contestants. As the divisive primary thesis is developed in the literature, the concern is with the impact of supporting
winners and losers in the primary election . Thus, primary divisiveness
is defined as the percentage of the primary election vote at the county
level received by the winner of the primary state-wide. The greater the
nominee's percentage of the primary vote in the county, the less divisive
the primary is considered to be. The smaller the percentage, the more
divisive the primary is considered to be. The percentage for each county
was subtracted from 100 so that higher values equal greater divisiveness.
Data were taken from official primary election returns from each of
Ohio's 88 counties for the gubernatorial and U. S. Senate primaries in
May, 1970.14
1 2 The Democratic Senate primary was a four man race, but two candidates were
not considered serious contenders .
18 Other evidence of division is suggested by the 40 percent in the Democratic
Party who endorsed a loser in their party's Senate primary and the 41 and 27 percent
respectively in the Republican Party who endorsed losers in their party's Senate and
gubernatorial primaries.
u Selected distributional characteristics of primary divisiveness

Democratic Party
Gov.
Sen.

Republican Party
Gov.
Sen.

Primary) divisiveness
43%

62%
9%
50%

74%

84%

Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59%
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7%
Minimum
Maximum

........................
........................

56%
11%

35%
82%

59%
5%
51%
72%
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To assess the impact of prima ry divisiveness on general election
vote, one should have a measure that takes into consideration the usual
electoral performance of the parties in general elections for each office
within each county; i.e., an expected party vote for each office in each
county, one tl1at reflects the continuous overtime electoral strengths of
the parties. An expected party vote was calculated for each office in
each county by regressing each county's Republican percentage of the
two party vote in the 1970 general election on the same percentage from
three preceding general elections. For the governorship, these were 1958,
1962, and 1966, for the U. S. Senate , 1962, 1964, and 1968. Here too,
data were official general election returns from each county for both
major parties for the office of governor and U. S. Senate. The residual
variation , each county's actual vote minus its expected vote, is a measure
which reflects influences on the election other than the long-term
partisa n forces within each county. 15
Support for winning and losing primary candidates among county
chairmen was measured from responses to a mailed questionnaire. 16
Following the general election, questionnaires were mailed to each
chairman asking them which candidate they preferred in the primary ,
how strongly they preferred the candidate , and whether they endorsed
and worked for the candidate. From these items, a number of simple
15 Selected distributional characteristics of each county's actual vote minus its
expected vote ( residual variation) by party and office:

Gov. 0
Sen.
Gov.
Sen.
Standard Deviation
.6%
.7%
.8%
.8%
Minimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-2.5 %
-1.1 %
-2.0 %
-S.7 %
Maximum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5%
2.9%
3.8%
1.0%
0
The mean is, of course, zero for each office.
16 Response rat e was 77% ( 68) for Democratic chairmen and 65% ( 57) for
Republi can chairmen. A comparison of demographic and political characteristics of
counties of chairmen responding with all counties suggests those responding are
reasonably representative.
Counties of

Chairmen
Responding
Democratic Party
Mean population density per square mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
371
Mean family income .... . .. . .. . . . .................
10,049
Mean education among males . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6
Mean p ercent Republi can vote for governor in 1970 . . . .
51
Mean percent Republican vote for senator in 1970 . . . . . .
56
Republican party
Mean population density per square mile . . . . . . . . . . . . .
429
Mean family income . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 10,310
Mean education among males . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1
Mean percent Republican vote for governor in 1970
51
Mean percent Republican vote for senator in 1970
54

All
Counties
465
10,162
11.6
55
51
321
10,058
12.6
55
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scales were constructed. For example, chairmen were asked how
strongly they favored their preferred candidate in their party's gubernatorial and senate primaries: very strongly, quite strongly, somewhat
strongly, not strongly at all. Chairmen who preferred a loser in the
primary and indicated a very strong preference were scored -4, quite
strong -3, somewhat strong -2 , and not strong at all -1. Chairm en
who preferred the winner in the primary were scored 4, 3, 2, and 1
respectively. The method was the same for having endorsed a candi date
where there were three categories; public endorsement, private endors ement, and no endorsement; and having worked for a candidate wh ere
there were two; having worked and not having worked. Scores of each
of these were also combined into a single cumulative scale. 17 In the
analysis that follows these scales as well as the measure of prim ary
divisiveness outlined above are related to the measure reHecting differences between actual and expected party votes for the office of governor
and U. S. Senate for each county.
Analysis
What then was the impact of the 1970 primaries in Ohio on the
general election? The relationships between primary divisiveness and
expected vote for each of the races are revealed in Table One. Contr ary
to expectations, in the Democratic Party both the gubernatorial and
Senate nominee did better than expected in the general election in
counties where their primary opponent ran well. The relationship is
particularly strong for the gubernatorial primary. On the average, the
Republican vote in the general election declined 2.5 percent with each
increment in divisiveness. In the Senate primary, the relationship is
weaker, registering a decline of 1.3 percent with each unit increase in
divisiveness. The Republican Party is, however, another matter. Here,
17

Selected distributional characteristics of primary election support scales:
Democratic Party
Gov.
Sen.

Primary preference
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8
Endorsed primary preference
Mean .... . .. . .. . ............
1.9
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3
Worked for primary preference
. .. 1.4
Mean .. . . . .. . ............
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9
Cumulative Scale
. . ... . . . .. 6.4
Mean ... ... .......
3.9
Standard Deviation .... . ......

Republican Party
Goo.
Sen.

--0.2
3.0

1.4
2.8

-1.3
2.4

0.2
1.8

1.1
1.6

--0.6
1.6

0.1
1.2

0.9
1.2

--0.3
1.0

0.1
5.8

3.3
5.4

-2.2
4.8
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the expected relationship emerges for the gubrnatorial primary and is
reasonably strong, but no relationship exists at all for the party's Senate
primary. In the gubernatorial election, the party suffered a three percentage point decline on the average in its general election vote with
each unit increase in divisiveness.
TABLE ONE

Primary Divisiveness and Deviation from Expected Republican Vote
Republican Party

Democratic Party
Gubernatorial

Senate

Primary

Primary

Gubernatorial

r

b

r

b

-.26

-2.54

-.18

-1.33

Primary
r
b

Senate
Primary

,

b

.Olns

.OSW

Primary divisiveness

( High score equals
high divisiveness)

-.41

-3.05

ns = not significant at .05.

How is one to deal with these contradictory patterns? The findings
here as well as in other studies support the general, if not satisfactory,
conclusion that divisive primaries can harm a candidate's election
prospects, but that harm is not the inevitable consequence of a divisive
contest. If this is the case, the next step, it seems, is to begin to consider
and explore some of the conditions that bear on the relationship between
the divisive character of primary elections and general election performance. Some possibilities are suggested in the above analysis. Conceivable, one political party may find it more difficult to overcome divisions among its rank and file than another. One might expect, for
example, that the more ideologically diverse a political party, the more
difficult it would be to moderate the contentious spirit associated with
a hotly contested primary. One would not want to claim, however, and
the evidence, one suspects, would not support that the Republican
party in Ohio is more ideological than the Democrats.
The out-party, i.e., the party out of office, may also enjoy an advantage. Clem and Meier note that the publicity generated from a
divisive primary may add to the visibility of the party's general election
candidate, an advantage particularly against an incumbent office-holder.
There may also be reasonably strong incentive for the party's rank and
file to support the party's nominee, inspite of divisive primary, if the
party has been out of office for some time. While there were no incumbents running for re-election in either the gubernatorial or Senate
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primaries in Ohio, the Republican Party controlled both the govern orship and the Senate seat and had done so for several years. Findings
here are consistent with an out-party advantage.
Another factor is the nature of the primary itself and the nominee' s
response to it. One can imagine closely contested primaries that are not
antagonistic. The appeals of the contestants may be directed outwar d
toward the opposition party rather than toward their fellow partis ans.
Again, one might expect this if the opposition is incumbent. This may
have been the case in the Democratic primaries in 1970. The nominee' s
response to the primary can also make a difference. A conciliatory and
reaching out may succeed in bringing the party together mitigatin g
problems in the general election. .
There is also some evidence to suggest that primary outcomes be ar
more heavily on gubernatorial than Senate elections . Although one
would not want to push the evidence from selected case studies too far,
the difference may represent the greater perceived importance of the
governorship to the interests of the voters and the party. The costs associated with the loss of one's Senate preference, who would have bee n
one among 100 senators, may be considered less than the costs associat ed
with the loss of one's choice as the state's chief executive.
There is also the possibility that local circumstances will interven e.
For example, in Ohio prior to the primary elections Governor Rhodes,
who lost the Republican Party's Senate nomination to Robert Taft, and
State Auditor Roger Cloud, who won the party 's gubernatorial nomin ation, were implicated in what became known as the state house loan
scandal. It involved a series of poor and questionable investments of
state monies to persons close to and involved with the Republic an
Party, particularly Rhodes. This, no doubt, contributed to Rhodes' defe at
in the primary and perhaps to Cloud's defeat in the general election and
may explain the strong relationship observed in Table One. If thi s is
true, it means that Cloud received his biggest primary challenge in
those counties where the voters were most disturbed by the party' s
involvement in the scandal, and willing to vote Democratic in November
because of it, a distinct possibility.
There is also the role of the party organization. It may not be a
divisive primary per se that undermines a party 's or candidate's electi on
prospects, but the failure of the party organization to rally aroun d its
nominee and work for his/her election. Primary contests have the potential to divide the party organization as well as the rank and file.
It may be that these divisions are responsible for either losing or doing
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Jess than expected in the general election. The party organization is,
for example, responsible for campaigning and working for the election
of its nominees. It can be a major instrument for activating supporters
and stimulating them to participate. 18 If the organization fails in this,
the party vote may suffer. A highly divisive primary at the electoral
level may have little consequence for the general election if the party
organization can unite.
The data in Table Two bear on this issue. It revals the relationship
between several dimensions of primary support on the part of the county
party chairmen and deviations from the expected Republican vote. The
loss of one's preferred candidate in the primary appears to have had
little effect on the general election vote. All correlations are quite low
and, with the exception of the Democratic gubernatorial primary, statistically insignificant. While little should be made of such low correlations
even when they are statistically significant, the modest negative relationship for the Democratic gubernatorial primary may point to problems Gilligan, a liberal candidate, had with a number of conservative
party leaders. It may be that Gilligan, the overwhelming favorite of
party leaders, did better than expected in the general election in counties
where he was the preferred primary nominee of the county chairman.
In any case, the general conclusion is that divisions among party leaders
over the party's nominee revealed in the preferences and activities of
the leadership seem to be unrelated or only modestly so to the general
election vote. This may not be unexpected. As suggested earlier, expectations associated with involvement in the regular party may limit
the influence of the regular organization on the vote. A professional
orientation may characterize party leaders which limits the impact of
candidate and/ or ideological divisions. In other words, party leaders
are expected to perform in a way that contributes to the electoral success
of the party regardless of their personal inclinations. One would not,
however, expect this of personal campaign organizations.
18 See for example William J. Crotty, "Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote,"
American Political Science Review, 65 (June, 1971), 439-450, and the literature

cited therein.
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TABLE TWO
Support for Primary Election Winner and Deviation from
Expected Republican Vote
Democratic Party
Gubernatorial
Primary

Preferred Primary Winner . .
-.19°
Endorsed Primary Winner . .
- .13ns
Worked for Primary Winner . . -.lOns
Cumulative Support Scale . . . . -.17
0
Denotes Pearson product moment correlation.
ns

=not significant

Republican Party

Senate
Primary

Gubernatorial
Primary

Senate
Primary

.08ns

.09ns
.02ns
.12ns
.06ns

.02,ns
.()(3na
.()()na
.()3nl

.13ru

.09ns

.lOns

at .05.

Conclusion
Conventional wisdom and popular lore suggest that primary elections that divide a political party undermine the party's chances of
of success in the general election. There are two components of this
thesis that can be examined. One maintains that the rank and file of a
party who support a loser in a hard fought primary will withhold their
support for the party's nominee in the general election or defect and
support the opposition. The other treats the party organization, activists
and leaders, as an instrument for mobilizing the vote and maintains that
organizations active and supportive of a loser in a "hotly" contested
primary will be less active in the general election on behalf of the
party's nominee. Less effort and activity means a lower vote for the
party in the general election.
The evidence from the primary elections in Ohio in 1970, although
limited-it is drawn from a single state and single point in time-cannot
dispute the first. Clearly, the general election vote for the Republican
gubernatorial candidate in 1970 was lower than expected in counties
where his primary vote was lower and higher in counties where his
primary vote was higher. However , the opposite was true for both the
Democratic gub ernatorial and Senate candidates and the vote for the
Republican Senate candidate was unaffected by the primary outcome.
The answer to the question "Does a divisive primary hurt a candidate's
election chances?" appears to be an unsatisfactory but perhaps realistic,
it depends.
With respect to the 1970 elections , the Democrats were the outparty and the Republicans were attempting to overcome a charge of
corruption leveled at their outgoing Governor . As a result, the primary
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campaign in the Democratic Party, particularly for the governorship,
focused on the Governor, his and his party's shortcomings, rather than
the other Democratic candidates. The Democratic gubernatorial primary
was, as such, somewhat consensual serving to unite rather than divide.
Just the opposite was true for the Republicans. Thus, being the outparty, challenging an unpopular incumbent administration, and directing the primary campaign at the opposition may be factors that lessen
the effects of divisive primaries.
As for division among party leaders, this appears to have little or
no influence on the vote. Whether a party chairmen supported, endorsed, or worked for a winner or loser in the primary made no difference in the general election vote for the party. While this can mean a
number of things, it seems that all county chairmen were reasonably
active, performing a number of routine campaign activities on behalf
of the party's candidate. Thus, support for a losing primary candidate
did not have any electoral consequences. Whatever threat divisive
primaries pose to election success, it appears that it operates through
the party's rank and file rather than the party leadership.

